bail—and they wouldn't have to come back for a hearing and they would be in the country.

The stories are quite clear from the investigative officers that people are crossing the border with children and they go right up to the Border Patrol officers and turn themselves in. The Border Patrol officers turn them over to Homeland Security, and Homeland Security doesn't deport them. They set them up for some sort of trial or hearing, which may take up to 500 days. Then they find a place for them and they take care of them. It is just the kind of process that makes no sense for a serious Nation. That is all I am saying.

Why are we seeing this large number again? It is because they believe it works. And in fact it is working. In fact, young people who are coming in with their parents or brothers or uncles or aunts are coming into the country and both of them are staying. Nobody is really being deported, and they don't intend to leave.

The President created this policy, and now it has caused a national crisis. I hope we can do better. I hope in the course of the discussion we can improve on our law and find some strength for the President and put some strength behind our law enforcement in America.

Chairman GOODLATTE, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the House, has made a strong statement. He said he simply cannot provide money until we have clarity that we are going to be taking action in this country that will keep this from happening in the future. We certainly need to do that, and if we do, I am more optimistic than a lot of people.

I truly believe if we follow up aggressively and start promptly reporting people who come here illegally instead of talking about it and not releasing them on bail on permisos, the word will get out in Central America just as it got out that they could come and stay. The message that will get out will tell them: Don't come here or you will take a risk. You will lose your money, you will lose everything you invested in this attempt, and you will be sent back. If we do that, the numbers will start to fall, and we might be surprised how fast those numbers would fall. It would be good for public policy and the rule of law.

I thank the Chair, yield the floor, and note the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask to address the Senate as in morning business and take such time as I may consume.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT SUPPORT SYSTEM

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, at a time when vital defense programs are threatened due to a lack of funding, the Federal Government has wasted billions of dollars attempting to procure new large information technology systems, consistently disregarding lessons learned from past failures and well-established acquisition best practices.

Even with a current annual budget of $80 billion for information technology projects, the Federal Government struggles to make those systems work. The American people can still remember the embarrassing failure of healthcare.gov, the Obama administration's most recent information technology fiasco. What they may not realize is the Health and Human Services' healthcare.gov mess is not unique and is, in an important sense, merely business as usual in how the government, particularly the Department of Defense, acquires large information technology systems.

The Pentagon is responsible for many of the most egregious cases of wasted taxpayer dollars when it comes to government information technology programs. Lack of planning for these acquisitions within the Armed Forces has made the adoption of new information technology systems an expensive and risky endeavor. The Air Force's Expeditionary Combat Support System, or ECSS, is a prime example of how a system designed to save money can actually waste billions of taxpayer dollars without producing any usable capability.

Today the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a bipartisan report on the failed acquisition of the ECSS, a program that was supposed to decrease costs and increase efficiencies by consolidating the Air Force's hundreds of legacy logistic systems into a single new system.

It is important to recognize that what happened with ECSS is not an isolated case of incompetence. Unfortunately, it is one of the many examples that show how billions of dollars can be wasted if the intended acquisition is not started off right with a detailed plan that includes clear, stable requirements and achievable milestones supported by realistic original cost estimates and reliable assessments of risk.

The subcommittee's report notes that the Air Force started the ECSS acquisition in 2004 with the goal of obtaining a single "transformational" unified logistics and supply chain management system that would allow the Air Force to track all of its physical assets worldwide, from airplanes, to fuel, to spare parts. These types of computer platforms; that is, large business systems that companies use to make their businesses operate more efficiently, are known as enterprise resource planning systems or ERPs. Basically, ECSS was supposed to be an enterprise resource planning system that would have combined all of the Air Force's global logistics and its associated supply chain management activities under one streamlined management information technology system.

As the Department of Defense's overall strategy to become fully auditable hinges on how successfully it procures and integrates these systems into its business enterprises, failures such as the ECSS are not only costly to the taxpayer but also disastrous to the Department's larger financial improvement efforts.

To keep costs down, the Air Force intended to build its new ERP system using already available commercial software instead of a software system designed from scratch. That type of commercial software, however, works best when the organization using it follows efficient business processes. In order to take advantage of the commercial software that supported ECSS, the Air Force needed to dramatically change longstanding internal business processes that supported how it managed global logistics and its associated supply chain.

That never happened. Unfortunately, the culture of resistance to change in the Air Force made it difficult to make those changes. The Air Force needed strong leaders who could communicate not only the goals of ECSS to end users and get their buy-in but also develop sound program management strategies to overcome resistance to change among those lower level personnel. Ultimately, the leaders of the ECSS Program did not effectively communicate with the end users. Without their buy-in, ECSS was doomed to fail before it even started.

Because the Air Force had not adequately planned what needed to be done to procure ECSS effectively, it was easier for program managers to order changes in configuration that in effect customized the commercial software on the fly rather than alter the Air Force's own culture. That caused costs to skyrocket and delivery schedules to slip.

The Air Force's eagerness for expensive customization was especially troubling given that as early as 2004, the Air Force identified the need to avoid customizing the commercial software lest costs explode. But in the end, it failed to heed its own advice. The subcommittee report finds that the Air Force's customization of the commercial software was a major root cause of ECSS's failure.

Such customization could have been avoided had the Air Force fully and timely implemented a congressionally mandated procedure for improving its operations called business process reengineering. Business process reengineering, which is a proven private